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COERCION, FRAUD, AND WHAT IS WRONG WITH BLACKMAIL 
forthcoming in LEGAL THEORY 
Stephen Galoob 
University of Tulsa College of Law 
 
Abstract 
Several theorists argue that blackmail is morally wrong because the blackmail proposal is 
coercive. These coercion-based views are promising but incomplete. A full explanation 
of blackmail’s immorality must address both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail 
agreement. I defend what I call the complex account, on which blackmail is morally 
wrong because blackmail proposals are coercive and blackmail agreements are 
fraudulent. The complex account avoids difficulties that beset other coercion-based views 
and provides a stronger case for why blackmail should be criminalized. 
 
Several scholars argue that blackmail is morally wrong because it is coercive.1 These 
coercion-based views focus on the blackmail proposal, the blackmailer’s offer or threat to 
act in a certain way (paradigmatically, to disclose information whose revelation would 
                                                
* Thanks to, among others, Chuck Adams, Craig Agule, Brian Berkey, Mitch Berman, 
Robert Butkin, Michael Cahill, Vincent Chiao, Russell Christopher, Niko Cornell, 
Mihailis Diamantis, Mindy Galoob, Andrew Gold, Stuart Green, Sam Halabi, Adam Hill, 
Robert Hughes, Eric Johnson, Adam Kolber, Grant Lamond, Ethan Leib, Phil Nichols, 
Japa Pallikkathayil, David Rubenstein, Alex Sarch, Naomi Schoenbaum, Amy Sepinwall, 
James Shaw, Bob Spoo, Simon Stern, Rob Weber, Ray Yasser, and an anonymous 
reviewer for LEGAL THEORY. Thanks also to audiences at the Oklahoma Junior Scholars 
Conference, the Washington University Law School Junior Scholars Conference, the 
NYU Criminal Law Theory colloquium, and the Zicklin Center Normative Business 
Ethics workshop at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. The animating 
example of this paper was inspired by a comment made by Merlin Holland, Oscar 
Wilde’s grandson and biographer, during the Oscar Wilde and the Law conference at the 
University of Tulsa College of Law in the fall of 2013. 
1 James R. Shaw, The Morality of Blackmail, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165 (2012); Mitchell 
Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 795 (1998); Mitchell Berman, Blackmail, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 37–106 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011); 
Dan Fitzpatrick, The Philosophy of Blackmail: Indecent Offers or Coercive Proposals, 29 
J. SOC. PHIL. 37 (1998); Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 43 (1992); Grant Lamond, Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of 
Blackmail, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 215–238 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 
1996). 
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harm or embarrass the target of blackmail) unless the target agrees to the blackmailer’s 
demands. On James Shaw’s simple account, the typical blackmail proposal wrongs the 
target by unjustifiably impinging his authority to decide what to do. 
Coercion-based views are a genuine breakthrough for explaining the immorality 
of blackmail, which is one of the most-discussed questions in criminal law. Yet although 
coercion-based views capture a core aspect of why blackmail is wrong, they are 
incomplete. They do not explain everything that is wrong with blackmail, nor do they 
offer a fully convincing explanation of why blackmail should be criminalized. Meeting 
these challenges requires analyzing the blackmail agreement as well as the blackmail 
proposal. 
In this article I defend the complex account of why blackmail is wrong. On this 
view, blackmail is typically wrong because the blackmail proposal is coercive and the 
agreement contemplated in that proposal is fraudulent. The complex account is a friendly 
amendment to coercion-based views like Shaw’s simple account. Compared to 
alternatives, the complex account provides a more complete explanation of why 
blackmail is immoral and a stronger case for why blackmail should be criminally 
prohibited. 
Section I summarizes Shaw’s simple account and raises some difficulties that 
apply both to this view and to coercion-based views more broadly. Section II articulates 
and defends the complex account. I provide a contingent argument that blackmail is 
appropriately criminalized because many blackmail agreements are fraudulent, as well as 
a more categorical argument that blackmail agreements are fraudulent in any just legal 
system. The complex account preserves the strengths of Shaw’s simple account while 
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avoiding its difficulties. In the Conclusion, I discuss some general implications of the 
complex account for theorizing about blackmail. Appendix 1 shows how the complex 
account can be used to supplement another coercion-based view, Mitchell Berman’s 
evidentiary theory of blackmail. 
 
I. WHY BLACKMAIL IS WRONG: COERCION 
Subsection A analyzes the strengths of coercion-based views, focusing on Shaw’s simple 
account. I focus on the simple account not to endorse it but because, along with Berman’s 
evidentiary theory, it is the best developed coercion-based view. Subsection B describes 
some difficulties facing the simple account and many other theories of why blackmail is 
wrong. 
 
A. Shaw’s Simple Account 
To orient the discussion, consider the following episode, “probably the most famous 
blackmail attempt in history,”2 from the life of Oscar Wilde. William Allen, a 
professional blackmailer, obtained several letters from Wilde to Lord Alfred Douglas that 
referenced Wilde’s sexual conduct with young men. Wilde later testified that Allen 
approached him by noting that “a very curious construction could be put upon” one of 
Wilde’s letters to Douglas. Wilde recounted the following exchange: 
 “Art is rarely intelligible to the criminal classes.” [Allen] said, “A man offered 
me £6o for it.” [Wilde then] said to [Allen], “If you take my advice you will go to 
that man and sell my letter to him for £6o. I myself have never received so large a 
sum for any prose work of that length; but I am glad to find that there is some one 
in England who considers a letter of mine worth £6o.”3 
Once it became clear that Wilde would not agree to the proposal, Allen “changed 
his manner” and admitted living in desperate poverty. Wilde gave Allen a half-sovereign 
out of pity, and Allen later returned the incriminating letter to Wilde. 
                                                
2 ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL BLACKMAIL: A MODERN HISTORY (2002), at 22. 
3 RICHARD ELLMANN, THE TRIAL OF OSCAR WILDE (1996), at 419. 
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From Wilde’s case, we can identify two notions that are important for analyzing 
the wrongfulness of blackmail. First, the blackmail proposal is the blackmailer’s 
indication of an intention to do X (for example, to disclose a secret of the target) unless 
the target and blackmailer enter into an agreement under which the target agrees to do Y 
(paradigmatically, to pay money to the blackmailer) and the blackmailer agrees not to do 
X. In order for the proposal to be an instance of blackmail, the blackmailer’s X-ing must 
have the antecedent deontic status of being permissible.4 
In Wilde’s case, the blackmail proposal was Allen’s indication of his intent to 
disclose the incriminating contents of Wilde’s letter if Wilde did not pay Allen at least 
£60. Implicit in this proposal is that Allen would agree not to disclose the contents of 
Wilde’s letter if Wilde agreed to pay Allen at least £60. Assume for the sake of argument 
that Allen’s disclosing the contents of Wilde’s letter would have the antecedent status of 
being permissible, since it would be neither forbidden nor required.5  
Second, we can preliminarily define the blackmail agreement or exchange6 as the 
transaction, prompted by the blackmail proposal, by which the target agrees (and 
therefore incurs an obligation) to do Y, the blackmailer agrees (and incurs an obligation) 
not to do X, and these obligations interdepend in the way that is constitutive of 
                                                
4 The antecedent permissibility of doing X is sometimes said to differentiate blackmail 
from extortion, where the action referenced in the proposal is antecedently impermissible. 
See Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 
(1993), at 1599. 
5 Some might dispute this assumption on the grounds that since sodomy was a crime in 
Britain at the time of Allen’s proposal, Allen’s failure to disclose would have violated a 
moral or legal duty to disclose information of criminal wrongdoing to authorities. JOEL 
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988), at 241–245. 
6 The term blackmail exchange is more prominent in the literature, but the term blackmail 
agreement seems more accurate. I use these terms synonymously. 
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agreements.7 Not all blackmail proposals lead to agreements. For example, Allen and 
Wilde did not enter into a blackmail agreement. In refusing Allen’s proposal, Wilde did 
not put himself under a new obligation to pay Allen any sum. Likewise, because Wilde 
refused his proposal, Allen incurred no new obligation to keep the contents of Wilde’s 
letter secret. 
Wilde’s case shows how the existence of a blackmail agreement depends on the 
interrelated intentions and behaviors of the parties. In the wake of a blackmail proposal, 
the blackmailer might refrain from doing X and the target might do Y. Yet there is no 
agreement if these actions do not respond to the blackmail proposal. For example, Wilde 
actually paid Allen some money, but because he felt sorry for Allen rather than in 
exchange for Allen’s silence. Wilde’s action was occasioned by Allen’s proposal but was 
not a response to it. Likewise, Allen handed over Wilde’s letter, but not in exchange for 
Wilde’s payment. Thus Wilde and Allen did not enter into a blackmail agreement, even 
though each behaved in a way (Wilde paying Allen money, Allen handing over Wilde’s 
letter) consistent with them having entered into such an agreement. 
Shaw’s simple account aims to explain why blackmail is morally wrong. In 
general, he contends, a “coercive announcement” like the blackmail proposal is morally 
“impermissible if it attaches a sanction to an option in an agent’s deliberation that the 
agent is entitled to deliberate about.”8 Shaw does not offer a full description of “when an 
                                                
7 Hanoch Sheinman, Agreement as Joint Promise, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 365 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011), at 369–370. I refine this 
preliminary definition in Section II.A. 
8 Shaw, supra note 1, at 166. 
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agent is entitled to deliberate about an available action without sanction.”9 Rather, he 
identifies a common feature: if I am entitled to decide whether to perform an action, then 
you would wrong me by attaching sanctions to my performance of that action in a way 
that interferes with my deliberation on this matter.10 If you would wrong me by 
interfering with matters over which I have the right to deliberate, then you would also 
wrong me by communicating that you will interfere with my deliberation.11 
The simple account therefore holds not only that blackmail is wrong but also that 
it wrongs the target distinctly by impinging on his or her deliberative authority. This 
infringement is significant even if it does not also set back the target’s interests overall. In 
the paradigmatic blackmail case, the target has the “default discretionary authority” to 
“go about [his or her] business without compensating the blackmailer.”12 By making the 
proposal, the blackmailer attempts to “undu[ly] influence[]” the target’s exercising this 
authority by raising the costs of exercising it.13 Although Shaw does not use these terms, 
the wrongfulness of this influence can be seen as a form of what Arthur Ripstein calls 
“usurpation.”14 In making the blackmail proposal, the blackmailer is a usurper because he 
                                                
9 Id. at 167. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 168. 
12 Id. at 175. 
13 Id. at 177. 
14 ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
(2009), at 54. On Ripstein’s Kantian view, “you are independent only if you are the one 
who decides what ends you will use your powers to pursue, as opposed to having 
someone else decide for you.” Id. at 33. Someone else can interfere with your 
independence by either usurping or destroying your powers to set and pursue purposes. 
Id. at 43. When someone usurps your powers, he “deprives you of the ability to be able to 
decline to pursue purposes unless you have set them.” Id. at 44. For Ripstein, usurping 
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attempts to get the target to exercise his default discretionary authority for the 
blackmailer’s purposes.15 
This brief description of the simple account seems to raise a tension. On the 
definition offered above, the action referenced in the blackmail proposal is antecedently 
permissible. Yet the simple account suggests that the blackmail proposal renders doing X 
impermissible, which in turn renders impermissible the conditional proposal to do X. So, 
one might wonder, is doing X permissible, or is it not? 
                                                                                                                                            
your powers amounts to “using” you, insofar as the usurpation renders your choice 
subject to someone else’s will and deprives you of the “ability to decide what to do” for 
yourself. Id. Japa Pallikkathayil defends a similar notion of coercion as usurpation. See 
Japa Pallikkathayil, The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with 
Coercion, 11 PHIL. IMPRINT 18 (2011). 
“Usurpation” is not the only or even the most common way to construe the wrongfulness 
of coercion. Alternative accounts focus on different features, such as the ways that 
coercion negates reciprocity and therefore violates the target’s moral equality; see, e.g., 
STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT (2006), at 22; or puts the target 
in a position “where her goals become self-undermining”; Saba Bazargan, Moral 
Coercion, 14 PHIL. IMPRINT 1 (2014), at 6; or constitutes an irresponsible act of reason-
creation by the coercer; A.J. Julius, The Possibility of Exchange, 12 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 
361 (2013), at 362–363; or brings about a relationship in which the target is dominated by 
the coercer; Scott Anderson, The Enforcement Approach to Coercion, 5 J. ETHICS & SOC. 
PHIL. (2010); Niko Kolodny, What Makes Threats Wrong, forthcoming in ANALYTIC 
PHILOSOPHY); or wrongfully puts pressure on the target’s will or liberty to do otherwise; 
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987); Mitchell Berman, The Normative Functions of 
Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45 (2002). 
Coercion-based accounts of blackmail differ, inter alia, based on the notions of wrongful 
coercion that they utilize. For example, Lamond explains the wrongfulness of coercion in 
terms of domination: in coercing the target, the blackmailer attempts to obtain (over the 
target’s objections or invalid consent) “whatever [he] demand[s]” of the target.” Lamond, 
supra note 1, at 233–234. By contrast, Berman’s evidentiary theory incorporates the 
“wrongful pressure” notion of coercion. See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 66–67. 
For Berman, blackmail proposals are coercive when the action referenced in the proposal 
would, if carried out, wrongfully set back certain of the target’s interests, and the 
prospect of this wrongful harming exerts pressure on the target’s liberty or will. 
15 RIPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 43. See also Lamond, supra note 1, at 219. 
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Shaw resolves this tension by arguing that whether an agent acts permissibly can 
“be sensitive to the motives and values of that agent.”16 Some object to this position 
generally, and for that reason would be inclined to reject the simple account. For the sake 
of argument, assume that intentions can bear directly on the permissibility of actions. 
However, based on this assumption, it is premature to say above that the X-ing referenced 
in the blackmail proposal is antecedently permissible. More accurately, doing X could be 
permissible if it were done for the right reasons. However, after the blackmailer makes 
the proposal, it can be inferred that his later doing X would be impermissible because it 
would not be done for the right reasons.17 
But how, exactly, does making the blackmail proposal indicate that the 
blackmailer’s later doing X would not be done for the right reasons? To support this 
inference, Shaw identifies a “subtle form of moral turpitude” that he calls “impermissible 
disregard.”18 According to Shaw, you show impermissible disregard for my well-being 
by knowingly creating harms for me that are “not appropriately offset” by the value of 
“your own furthered ends,” even if the creation of these harms could have been justified 
in furtherance of some worthwhile goal.19 In paradigmatic cases of informational 
blackmail, the target has a default discretionary authority regarding paying the 
blackmailer money and entering into an agreement with him. By proposing to release the 
information if the target refuses to enter into a blackmail agreement, the blackmailer 
attaches sanctions to the target’s decisions regarding these issues. These actions attempt 
                                                
16 Shaw, supra note 1, at 171. 
17 Id. at 170–171; see also Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 69–70. 
18 Shaw, supra note 1, at 169. 
19 Id. at 170. 
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to usurp the target’s deliberative authority, and they also manifest an impermissible lack 
of concern for his interests.20 
The simple account can cleanly explain the wrong in Wilde’s case. Allen’s 
statement to Wilde implied that Allen would expose Wilde’s letter unless Wilde entered 
into an agreement. The sexual behavior referenced in the letter was criminal in England 
at the time. Revelation of Wilde’s secret would severely harm his reputation and, 
eventually, land him in prison. Wilde clearly had a general authority to decide whether to 
transfer funds to Allen.21 In making his proposal to Wilde, Allen attempted to take 
control Wilde’s authority to make this decision. Although some considerations might 
have justified Allen in taking control of Wilde’s authority in this domain, “that Allen 
wanted to get at least £60” or “that Allen wanted to punish Wilde for refusing to enter 
into a blackmail agreement whereby Allen would have obtained £60” are insufficient 
reasons to do so. 
The simple account appraises blackmail’s wrongfulness in terms of the blackmail 
proposal. As Shaw notes, “[i]n the case of impermissible coercion, it is the announcement 
                                                
20 Id. at 172. Thus it is perhaps more accurate to characterize Shaw as offering a 
“usurpation and disregard” account of wrongful coercion—usurping someone’s 
deliberative authority is what makes a proposal coercive, and the disregard animating the 
proposal is (at least part of) what makes the proposal wrongful. My contention that Shaw 
offers a “usurpation” account of wrongful coercion should be read to include this proviso. 
21 One might also contend, somewhat anachronistically, that Wilde had authority to 
decide whether to reveal information about his sexual behavior to the world. However, 
whether Allen’s proposal is coercive does not depend on whether Wilde has the right to 
control the disclosure of this information. As noted above, Shaw sees the infringement of 
the target’s default discretionary authority as sufficient to make the blackmail proposal 
wrong. Id. at 193. In other words, Allen’s blackmail proposal would have been 
objectionably coercive even if Wilde had no entitlement regarding the disclosure of 
information about his sexual behavior. 
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(prototypically) that constitutes the way of tampering with another’s deliberation.”22 
Blackmail is coercive even if, as in Wilde’s case, the proposal does not lead to an 
exchange and the blackmailer never makes good on his expressed intention to do X. The 
simple account thus captures the inchoate nature of blackmail, or the way the wrong of 
blackmailing is accomplished “upon issuance of the [blackmail] proposal” rather than 
upon execution of a blackmail agreement.23 
In addition to capturing the inchoate nature of blackmail, the simple account has 
many other strengths. Like other coercion-based views, the simple account dissolves the 
so-called “paradox of blackmail,” the question of how the blackmail proposal could be 
morally or legally impermissible when each of its components (the blackmailer’s doing 
X; the blackmailer and target entering into an agreement whereby the blackmailer is 
obligated not do X and the target is obligated to Y) seems morally and legally 
permissible.24 The simple account also resolves the so-called “second paradox of 
                                                
22 Id. at 177. 
23 Russell Christopher, A Political Theory of Blackmail: A Reply to Professor Dripps, 3 
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 261 (2009), 265. Most extant criminal laws construe blackmail as an 
inchoate crime, in that liability attaches on the making of the proposal (rather than when a 
blackmail agreement is reached). See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of 
Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (1984), at 676 n. 31. 
24 Lindgren, supra note 23; Glanville Williams, Blackmail, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 79 
(1954), at 79–92, 162–172, 240–246. Others have contended that the legal version of the 
paradox is not strictly paradoxical, since many criminal offenses consist of components 
that are each morally and legally permitted. Michael Clark, There Is No Paradox of 
Blackmail, 54 ANALYSIS 54 (1994). The simple account provides an additional way to 
resolve the first paradox: there is no paradox because the blackmail proposal changes the 
status of doing X for the blackmailer. In making the proposal, the blackmailer both 
infringes the target’s deliberative authority and makes it the case that future X-ing would 
manifest disregard for the target. 
Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail 
 11 
blackmail,” which asks why blackmailer-initiated proposals regarding doing X are 
morally impermissible whereas target-initiated proposals are not.25 
 
B. Three Difficulties 
Despite these strengths, Shaw’s simple account faces several difficulties. These 
difficulties also apply to other coercion-based accounts as well as to a variety of 
approaches that explain the wrongfulness of blackmail on grounds other than coercion. 
1. The Ratification Objection 
One set of difficulties concerns how the creation of a blackmail agreement might affect 
the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal. The simple account has no response to the 
argument that the objectionable features of the blackmail proposal can be obviated when 
the blackmailer and target enter into an agreement. This argument, which I call the 
ratification objection, holds that the creation of the agreement can (at least in some 
circumstances) obviate the wrong-making features of the proposal.26 
                                                
25 Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1663 (1993). On the simple account, the blackmailer’s announcement attempts to 
usurp the target’s deliberative authority. If (as in the case of target-initiated proposals) 
there is no announcement by the blackmailer, then there is no attempt by the blackmailer 
to usurp this authority. A target-initiated proposal is an exercise of deliberative authority 
by the target rather than an attempted usurpation of that authority by the blackmailer. 
Shaw, supra note 1, at 178–179. 
26 The notion that a party’s actions can ratify (and therefore validate) an otherwise invalid 
agreement is a staple of contract law. See Joseph M. Perillo & John E. Murray, Jr. 1 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1.6 (2015) (in cases of voidable contracts, “the agreement may 
be made fully operative as against both of the parties, by the exercise of a power of 
ratification” by the “injured party with the power of avoidance”). 
A. John Simmons’s discussion of loyalty oaths and refugees is based on a version of the 
ratification objection. A state’s demand that people obey its laws is, for Simmons, a 
paradigmatic example of coercion, since it involves taking control over subjects’ 
individual authority to decide which obligations will apply to them. Thus a state that 
conditions the provision of citizenship to a victim of foreign repression only if the 
refugee takes such an oath makes a coercive proposal. Yet, Simmons argues, the validity 
of such an oath is an open question, one whose answer depends on whether the refugee 
had reasonable options other than taking the naturalization oath. A. John Simmons, 
Voluntarism and Political Associations, 67 VA. L. REV. 19 (1981), at 35–36. To be sure, 
many versions of voluntarism would dispute Simmons’s logic. However, the implication 
of Simmons’s argument is that the significance of any coercive features of the citizenship 
proposal can be obviated when the refugee takes the oath. Thus the ratification objection 
is viable on Simmons’s version of voluntarism, albeit perhaps not on other versions. 
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There are two aspects to the ratification objection. The first aspect is the claim 
that agreeing to a wrongful proposal could change the wrongfulness of the proposal. If a 
blackmail proposal is coercive, then (on the usurpation notion of coercion) it wrongfully 
impinges on the target’s deliberative authority. Yet part of having this deliberative 
authority seems to include the power to change the status or blame-aptness of actions that 
would otherwise wrong one or violate one’s rights.27 This exercise is consent when it 
occurs prior to the wrongdoing or violation and it is ratification when it occurs afterward. 
The second aspect is the claim that when someone attempts to impinge on an agent’s 
deliberation, entering into an agreement regarding the subject of the attempted 
impingement actually does ratify that impingement. According to the ratification 
objection, then, the target’s entering into the blackmail agreement could (and sometimes 
does) change the wrongfulness of the impingement in the blackmail proposal.28 
                                                
27 See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (2012), ch. 11. 
28 In correspondence, Shaw suggests a different way to deny the ratification objection 
from the one proposed here. Rather than disputing whether any blackmail agreement does 
ratify the usurpation implicit in the blackmail proposal, Shaw might deny that any 
agreement could change the usurpation implicit in the proposal. The argument, drawing 
from Pallikkathayil’s notion of “impaired normative authority,” is that a coercive 
proposal by a blackmailer necessarily invalidates the target’s default discretionary 
authority, including his authority to enter into agreements. See Pallikkathayil, supra note 
14, at 17, 19; see also David Owens, Duress, Deception, and the Validity of a Promise, 
116 MIND 293 (2007), at 304–305; Ram Rivlin, Blackmail, Subjectivity and Culpability, 
28 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 399 (2015), at 419–421; Lamond, supra note 1, at 234. 
However, this “impaired normative authority” strategy seems to get the wrong answer in 
a variety of blackmail scenarios. In Wilde’s actual case, it would imply that Wilde could 
not have made a valid promise to Allen in the wake of Allen’s proposal. Yet Wilde’s 
actual transfer of a half-sovereign to Allen seems valid. If Wilde had filched the coin 
from Allen’s purse after having handed it over, then Wilde would have been stealing. 
Since Wilde had the power to give a sovereign to Allen, it seems to follow that Wilde 
also had the power to promise to give Allen a half-sovereign. 
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Consider a real-world example of the ratification objection. Under U.S. law, 
sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination and therefore violates the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Many tokens of sexual harassment are coercive in exactly the way 
that blackmail proposals are. For example, in the prototype of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment, the harasser’s proposal references an act that he is otherwise entitled perform 
(e.g., firing, demoting, or refusing to hire the target) unless the target enters an exchange 
whereby the harasser agrees not to act in this way and the target agrees to have sex with 
the harasser. The prevailing legal view in the U.S. is that only “unwanted” conduct can 
constitute sexual harassment.29 The U.S. Supreme Court has found that a plaintiff’s 
actions (like participating in sexually charged banter or assenting to a sexual relationship 
with the harasser) can support the inference that ostensibly harassing behavior was not 
unwanted and thus change whether such behavior was coercive sexual harassment in the 
first place.30 The Court’s reasoning here reflects a form of the ratification objection: in 
the wake of an objectionable proposal, a subordinate’s acquiescence to the proposal from 
a superior can change whether the proposal has the significance that coercive proposals 
typically have. 
Many scholars see the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus on unwelcomeness as 
mistaken. Yet the ratification objection seems more broadly incorrect in contexts like 
sexual harassment and blackmail. In the wake of these kinds of coercive proposals (e.g., 
“have sex with me or you will lose your job” or “agree to pay me or I will expose your 
secret”), the target’s mere acquiescence does not usually change whether the proposal has 
                                                
29 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (“The gravamen of any sexual 
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’”). 
30 Id. 
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the significance that wrongful proposals have. Targeting someone for blackmail or sexual 
harassment in these ways is objectionable, even if the target accedes to the proposal. 
The simple account focuses on the wrongfulness of proposals and so lacks the 
resources to dispute the ratification objection on these grounds. Explaining why entering 
into a blackmail agreement does not typically cleanse blackmail of its impermissibility 
requires identifying wrong-making features of certain kinds of agreements independently 
of the wrong-making features of proposals. 
2. The Compounding Effect 
The ratification objection is not merely mistaken but backward. Typically, in the wake of 
a blackmail proposal, the target’s entering into a blackmail agreement amplifies rather 
than obviates the wrongfulness of the blackmailer’s conduct. Call this the compounding 
effect. 
A variety of theories can appreciate the compounding effect. Since the emphasis 
so far has been on the simple account, assume (with Shaw) that blackmail is wrongful 
because the proposal usurps the target’s deliberative authority in a way that manifests 
disregard for him or her. In Wilde’s actual case, Allen’s blackmail proposal was rejected. 
Consider this variation on the case: 
Wilde1: Wilde agrees to the exchange that Allen proposes. As a result of this 
agreement, Allen incurs an obligation not to reveal Wilde’s letter to authorities 
and Wilde incurs an obligation to pay Allen £60. 
It seems to me that Allen would commit a greater wrong in Wilde1 than he did in 
real life. This difference should be appreciable to any coercion-based view, and 
especially if the wrongfulness of coercion is appreciated in terms of “usurpation.” If the 
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agreement between Allen and Wilde were valid,31 then Wilde’s acquiescence to the 
proposal would appear to change his normative situation. After entering the agreement, 
Allen would have a “distinctive standing, authority, or sovereignty in relation to” 
Wilde.32 Any subsequent effort by Wilde to avoid paying for Allen’s silence would 
wrong Allen, since it would violate Allen’s authority over Wilde. Yet this development 
seems perverse. In making the blackmail proposal, the blackmailer wrongfully seeks to 
exercise control over the target’s deliberative authority. This attempted usurpation would 
succeed if the blackmailer were to acquire the power to change what the target is 
permitted or required to do going forward. 
The simple account has difficulty explaining the compounding effect for the same 
reasons that it has difficulty resisting the ratification objection. The simple account 
focuses on the coerciveness of the announcement, but it does not examine whether that 
announcement “has some actual effect on [the target’s] deliberation”33 or the power 
relations between the blackmailer and target. The simple account therefore could not 
identify a meaningful difference between the coerciveness of Allen in Wilde1 and in 
Wilde’s actual case (where the proposal was rejected). Yet this conclusion is both 
counterintuitive and inconsistent with the usurpation notion of coercion. If the agreement 
between Wilde and Allen is valid, then Wilde1 involves a successful rather than merely 
attempted usurpation of Wilde’s default discretionary authority. On the assumption that 
coercion is wrongful because it interferes with someone’s discretionary authority, 
                                                
31 I relax this assumption infra at note 89. 
32 Stephen Darwall, Demystifying Promises, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 255 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011), at 259. 
33 Shaw, supra note 1, at 166 n. 3. 
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actually acquiring the power to change someone’s normative situation would be a greater 
interference (and more wrongful) than an unsuccessful attempt to acquire this power.34 
A full explanation of why blackmail is wrong should therefore both resist the 
ratification objection and capture (or else explain away) the compounding effect. Because 
the simple account focuses on the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal, it cannot 
easily meet either of these challenges. 
3. Criminalizing Blackmail 
A third set of challenges concerns criminalization. Most people believe that blackmail is 
immoral and also that it should be illegal.35 This intuition is realized in the law, since 
blackmail is illegal in every U.S. jurisdiction and under the laws of every Commonwealth 
country. Indeed, theoretical discussions of blackmail usually aim to justify these legal 
prohibitions, with the moral wrongfulness of blackmail typically relevant as a premise in 
an argument about why blackmail should be criminalized.36 Likewise, those who favor 
the decriminalization of blackmail often concede (at least for the sake of argument) that 
many tokens of blackmail are immoral but deny that this immorality is sufficient to 
justify legal prohibition.37 
Shaw’s argument for the simple account analyzes blackmail as a moral 
phenomenon. Yet the simple account strongly (and perhaps uniquely) supports 
decriminalizing blackmail. Shaw contends that if the reasons for legally prohibiting 
blackmail parallel the reasons that blackmail is morally wrong, then there is a tension in 
                                                
34 The compounding effect is also appreciable on alternative notions of wrongful 
coercion, as discussed in the appendix in connection with the “wrongful pressure” notion 
of coercion that undergirds Berman’s evidentiary theory. 
35 Experimental work by Paul Robinson and colleagues supports this conjecture. Paul H. 
Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories of Blackmail: An 
Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291 (2011). 
36 E.g., Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 67 and 71–73. 
37 See, e.g., Eric Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273 (1982); Walter 
Block, The Crime of Blackmail: A Libertarian Critique, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1999), 
at 8–9. 
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the law.38 Blackmail proposals are illegal, and releasing truthful information about 
someone is legal. Yet both kinds of cases can involve infringements of the target’s 
deliberative rights in a way that manifests an impermissible disregard for his or her 
interests or authority.39 To clear up this tension, Shaw argues that we should either revise 
what criminal law prohibits or else change how we justify this prohibition. Shaw suggests 
three options: decriminalize blackmail; criminalize otherwise lawful information releases 
when they manifest disregard for a target; or allow “nonmoral concerns” (such as free 
speech values or epistemic doubts about identifying the reasons for which someone acts) 
to justify the difference in treatment.40 
Shaw does not indicate which of these options he favors, but only the 
decriminalization option seems viable. Any liberal account of criminalization would have 
difficulty justifying an arrangement in which information releases that manifested 
impermissible disregard were prohibited whereas otherwise identical information releases 
that did not manifest such disregard were decriminalized.41 Likewise, justifying 
blackmail’s criminalization in nonmoral terms would be revisionist, since the intuition 
that blackmail should be legally prohibited seems intimately connected with the intuition 
that blackmail is morally wrong.42 
                                                
38 Shaw, supra note 1, at 195. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 195–196; see also Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72–73. 
41 See Joel Feinberg, Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate, 72 SYNTHESE 
249 (1987), at 259–260. 
42 Saul Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying about Blackmail?, 55 ANALYSIS 116 (1995), 
at 120. 
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Furthermore, the simple account has difficulty responding to perhaps the most 
powerful abolitionist argument: that any coercion-based case for criminalizing blackmail 
will also call for criminalizing a variety of “hard economic transactions” that presumably 
should not be criminalized.43 To pull off this argument, the abolitionist postulates a licit 
economic transaction that involves exactly the same considerations that purportedly make 
blackmail wrongful—on Shaw’s view, that the proposal is an attempt to usurp the target’s 
deliberative authority and manifests impermissible disregard for him. Shaw offers the 
case of Fred the Landlord and Lucy the Tenant to illustrate impermissible disregard,44 
and the case can be modified slightly in order to invoke the usurpation notion of 
coercion.45 Shaw concludes that Fred’s actions towards Lucy are immoral, yet he 
concedes that they are within Fred’s “legal rights.”46 If so, then the coerciveness of a 
transaction type is insufficient to justify criminalizing (proposals to engage in) that 
transaction type—exactly as the abolitionist contends. 
Thus the simple account has a tendency toward abolitionism. To the extent that 
the simple account can explain why blackmail is morally wrong, it cannot explain why 
blackmail should be illegal or why this illegality is a function of blackmail’s moral 
                                                
43 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156 (1980); Russell 
Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO. L.J. 739 (2006), at 768–769. 
44 In Shaw’s example, Fred is a landlord, and Lucy his tenant on a monthly lease. Fred 
has previously warned Lucy that he may terminate their arrangement on short notice, 
although he realizes that doing so would make things very difficult for Lucy. Shaw 
supposes that Fred decides to terminate the lease for the not-very-good reason that “he 
has grown a little tired of having Lucy in the building.” Shaw, supra note 1, at 169–170. 
45 For example, Fred could tell Lucy, “I will kick you out unless you start looking for a 
new job,” even though Fred could not care less about what job Lucy has. 
46 Shaw, supra note 1, at 170. 
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wrongfulness. Nor can it differentiate blackmail from hard (but licit) commercial 
transactions. 
To be sure, this abolitionist tendency does not necessarily provide grounds for 
rejecting the simple account. Despite the ubiquity of blackmail’s criminalization, 
abolitionism might be the correct legal position. Nor does a tendency toward abolitionism 
challenge the simple account on its own terms. Shaw’s primary aim is to analyze 
blackmail as a moral phenomenon, so it is not an internal criticism of his argument that 
the simple account fails to resolve the legal puzzle of blackmail. However, in order to 
avoid abolitionism or a revisionist case for criminalizing blackmail, the simple account 
requires supplementation. 
In summary, Shaw’s simple account provides a powerful explanation of why 
blackmail is coercive. It also captures the inchoate nature of blackmail and dissolves two 
so-called paradoxes of blackmail. However, the simple account is incomplete. It cannot 
rule out that entering into a blackmail agreement ameliorates the objectionable aspects of 
the blackmail proposal, nor can it explain why a blackmailer’s wrongdoing might be 
amplified when the target agrees to the proposal. Further, the simple account’s case for 
why blackmail is morally wrong has either abolitionist or revisionist implications 
regarding the criminalization of blackmail. 
The difficulties facing Shaw’s simple account generalize to other coercion-based 
account of blackmail.47 Like many other theories (and nearly every other coercion-based 
                                                
47 Space constraints prevent a full defense of this claim. However, I demonstrate in the 
appendix why the difficulties facing the simple account also apply to Berman’s 
evidentiary theory (which utilizes a different notion of coercion). 
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account),48 the simple account explains the wrongfulness of blackmail in terms of the 
blackmail proposal. Yet, if the arguments in this Subsection are sound, then addressing 
the ratification objection and the compounding effect requires analyzing the blackmail 
agreement as well as the blackmail proposal. Furthermore, any coercion-based view faces 
significant (and, according to some, insurmountable) difficulty in explaining why 
blackmail is appropriately criminalized whereas other kinds of transactions that involve 
the same degree of coercion are licit.49 
 
II. WHY BLACKMAIL IS WRONG: A COMPLEX ACCOUNT 
It is possible to preserve the strengths of a coercion-based view like the simple account 
while avoiding these difficulties. The simple account and other coercion-based views 
largely focus on the wrong-making features of the blackmail proposal and neglect the 
wrong-making features of the blackmail agreement. The following view remedies this 
shortcoming: 
Complex Account: Blackmail is wrong because (i) the blackmail proposal is 
coercive; and/or (ii) the blackmail agreement contemplated in the proposal is 
fraudulent. 
The explanation for (i) can vary based on the coercion-based account that one 
favors. Shaw’s simple account makes the case for (i) in terms of the “usurpation” notion 
of wrongful coercion, whereas other coercion-based accounts utilize different notions of 
wrongful coercion. I mean this formulation to be compatible with the simple account and 
any other coercion-based view. Defending the complex account also requires establishing 
                                                
48 See, e.g., Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72; Clark, supra note 24, at 59–60; 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 45; Gorr, supra note 1, at 44; Lamond, supra note 1, at 223–
225. 
49 See, e.g., Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, supra note 43, at 769; Henry E. Smith, Harm 
in Blackmail, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 861 (1998), at 889. 
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that (ii) is true. I undertake this task in Subsection A. A full defense also requires 
showing that the case for (i) is compatible with the case (ii), that the complex account can 
both replicate the success of coercion-based views and improve on their shortcomings. 
Subsection B addresses these issues within the ambit of Shaw’s simple account. 
 
A. Why Blackmail Agreements Are Fraudulent: Two Arguments 
Fraud is a complicated wrong and crime. The judgment that behavior is fraudulent 
depends crucially on context. Actions that are fraudulent in some circumstances are not 
necessarily fraudulent in others.50 Consider this intuitively plausible claim. 
Valueless Fraud: It is fraudulent to attempt to exchange a token that you know 
(or have good reason to know) lacks the value characteristic of the type of which 
that token is an instance. 
Valueless fraud implies that a core aspect (although, perhaps, not the whole) of 
fraud is value. Proving criminal law charges of fraud usually requires showing that the 
defendant has deceived the target,51 but deception matters mainly in virtue of its 
connection to value. Say that Ben is a customer and Theresa is a shopkeeper. Ben pays 
for goods with a check whose drawee is a bank that Ben does not have an account with. 
Checks have value qua checks because they convey valid claims on a drawee. Ben’s hot 
check lacks the value characteristic of checks for Theresa because Ben has no claims to 
convey. In handing the check over to Theresa, Ben implicitly misrepresents that his check 
                                                
50 See Samuel Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2006), at 1973–
1975. 
51 See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006), at 153–160. 
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has the value that checks characteristically have. Ben’s check lacks this value, and Ben 
has good reason to know this. Therefore Ben is guilty of check fraud.52 
Valueless fraud can also arise in the context of agreements. Here the relevant 
value must be mutual—you defraud someone if you enter into an agreement that you 
know (or should know) would lack value for her, even if that agreement would have 
value for you. Thus it would be fraud for Bob to enter into an agreement with Tammy if 
he has good reason to know, at the time of formation, that the agreement lacks value for 
Tammy. By proposing that he and Tammy enter into such an agreement, Bob would 
attempt to defraud Tammy. This insight grounds the tort of “promissory fraud”: because 
every promise “necessarily carries with it the implied assertion of an intention to 
perform,” a promise “made without such an intention is fraudulent and actionable in 
deceit.”53 
Promissory fraud presupposes that agreements are valuable in part because they 
create certain obligations and manifest certain commitments. Hanoch Sheinman calls this 
insight the “face value principle for agreements”—the notion that valuable agreements 
                                                
52 For example, the Model Penal Code defines check fraud as the issuing or passing a 
check for the payment of money that one knows will not be honored by the drawee. If the 
issuer has no account with the drawee at the time the check is issued, then there is a 
presumption that that issuer knows that the check will not be paid. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§224.5 (1985). 
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §530 cmt. c (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 171 cmt. b (1981). Some deny that obligations and commitments 
necessarily run together in agreements. These theorists contend that agreements in which 
only obligations are exchanged can be (and are) valuable in a many circumstances, 
including when performing is roughly equivalent to paying damages. See IAN AYRES & 
GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005), at 
93–095. However, even if commitment-less agreements might be valuable in some 
circumstances, these circumstances are not applicable to blackmail agreements for the 
reasons discussed below. 
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characteristically involve both obligations and “relational commitments to do one’s part 
of the deal.”54 If Bob and Tammy enter into an agreement that Bob (at the time of 
formation) has no intention to perform, then their agreement lacks the prima facie value 
that agreements have. Because their agreement lacks value, Bob defrauds Tammy 
regardless of whether his subsequent behavior happens to conform to the terms of the 
agreement.55 
If valueless fraud is true, then whether a blackmail agreement is fraudulent 
depends on whether it lacks value qua agreement. Recall the preliminary definition 
offered above that the blackmail agreement is the undertaking, in response to the 
blackmail proposal, through which target agrees and thereby becomes obligated to do Y 
(e.g., pay money to the blackmailer), the blackmailer agrees and thereby becomes 
obligated not to do X (e.g., disclose the information), and these obligations interdepend in 
the way that is constitutive of agreements. We can now see that this definition is 
incomplete. For example, Sheinman’s “face value principle of agreements” suggests that 
the blackmailer’s intentions at the time of formation can determine whether the 
agreement has value.56 If the blackmailer intends to disclose the target’s information, then 
the agreement would lack value for the target. The target would be in a worse situation 
after making the agreement than she was before—not only would her secret be liable to 
                                                
54 Sheinman, supra note 7, at 367. 
55 Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud without Breach, WIS. L. REV. 507 
(2004), at 511–514. 
56 Ayres and Klass allow that mutually valuable agreements need not always be 
accompanied by intentions to perform one’s obligations, but note that agreements based 
on “blank promises” (in which one party intends at the time of agreement not to act in the 
way that the she promises) lack mutual value. AYRES & KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES, 
supra note 53, at 96–97. 
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exposure, but (assuming the agreement is valid) she would lack authority to decide 
whether to give money to the blackmailer. 
In addition to obligations and commitments regarding nondisclosure, a valuable 
blackmail agreement also generates obligations and corresponding commitments 
regarding unilateral renegotiation. George Fletcher contends that blackmail agreements 
threaten to instantiate a “relationship of dominance and subordination” between the 
blackmailer and the target, the essence of which “is the prospect of [the blackmailer’s] 
repeated demands.”57 These repeated demands are a way of unilaterally renegotiating the 
terms of the agreement. Seen in this light, blackmail agreements present a daunting first 
performer problem. The target’s action (paying the money) happens at the outset of the 
exchange, whereas the blackmailer’s action (keeping the secret) is distributed over time. 
After the target has initially performed, the blackmailer might unilaterally raise the cost 
of silence beyond the price contemplated in the agreement. As Ronald Coase puts it: 
business negotiations (which may also cause anxiety) either lead to a breakdown 
of the negotiations or they lead to a contract. There is, at any rate, an end. But in 
the ordinary blackmail case there is no end. The victim, once he succumbs to the 
blackmailer, remains in his grip for an indefinite period.58 
                                                
57 George Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617 (1993), 
at 1626–1627. 
58 Ronald Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 675 (1988); Murphy, supra note 43, at 
166. Ironically, the more rational the target is in appreciating the irrelevance of sunk 
costs, the more vulnerable he is to this form of predation. See Steven Shavell, An 
Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbery, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1877 (1993), at 1885–1886. 
Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail 
 25 
Thus a valuable blackmail agreement must also generate obligations for the 
blackmailer regarding unilateral renegotiation as well as commitments that correspond to 
these obligations. 
To illustrate this point, consider another variation on Wilde’s case: 
Wilde2: In response to Allen’s proposal, Allen and Wilde enter into an agreement 
under which Allen is obligated not to turn over the letter to authorities and Wilde 
is obligated to pay Allen £60. However, Allen intends not to abide by the 
agreement and to come back to Wilde for more funds after spending the initial 
£60. 
Allen would seemingly commit a greater wrong in Wilde2 than in Wilde1 (and, 
by extension, greater than Allen committed in real life). In Wilde1, Allen may or may not 
be committed to keeping his part of the agreement. In Wilde2, Allen would be committed 
to breaking the agreement at the time of formation. Therefore, the agreement in Wilde2 
would lack value in at least one way that the agreement in Wilde1 does not necessarily 
lack value.59 
Explaining the extent of the transgression in Wilde2 requires updating the 
definition of valuable blackmail agreements. In order for the blackmail agreement to be 
valuable for the target, the blackmailer must, at the time of formation, incur an obligation 
not to do X and an obligation not to renegotiate the terms of the agreement unilaterally, 
and he must have commitments that correspond to these obligations. The point is not 
merely that the savvy target would bargain for these obligations and commitments. 
                                                
59 Because, as discussed below, Allen acts coercively and commits fraud in both Wilde1 
and Wilde2, the difference in wrongfulness between these cases is only one of degree. 
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Rather, if any of these obligations or commitments were not present, then the blackmail 
agreement would lack value for the target (and therefore lack the mutual value that 
agreements characteristically have). 
Yet even this revised list of obligations and commitments does not fully capture 
the constituents of a valuable agreement. These obligations and commitments could be 
generated in other ways, for example through a series of representations that engender 
reliance or through disconnected promises between the blackmailer and the target. 
Consider the difference between promises and predictions of future behavior or 
intentions. If Allen were to promise Wilde that he would not disclose Wilde’s secret, then 
Allen would enable Wilde to hold him accountable for keeping the secret in different 
ways than if Allen merely predicted that he would not disclose the secret to anyone in the 
future.60 Promises come preequipped with accountability mechanisms that predictions of 
future behavior do not necessarily have. 
Likewise, agreements have special accountability mechanisms that promises do 
not necessarily have.61 If Wilde and Allen reach an agreement whereby Allen is to keep 
Wilde’s secret and Wilde is to pay Allen money, then Wilde can hold Allen accountable 
for keeping the secret in ways that would not necessarily be possible if these same 
obligations had arisen through a series of disconnected promises. For example, 
agreements allow a party to hold his counterparty accountable prior to the counterparty’s 
                                                
60 David Owens, A Simple Theory of Promising, 115 PHIL. REV. 51 (2006), at 54–61. 
61 E.g., DARWALL, SECOND-PERSON, supra note 14,  at 198–199; Sheinman, supra note 7, 
at 368. These mutual accountability mechanisms are generic features of agreements. 
Although these mechanisms can be fashioned out of disconnected promises, they are not 
generic to promises in the way that they are to agreements. Id. at 378–379 and 383–385. 
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violating her obligations.62 By contrast, conditional promises do not necessarily allow for 
this kind of prebreach accountability. Furthermore, agreements also have postbreach 
accountability mechanisms that are not always available for promises.63 In order for the 
blackmail agreement to have mutual value, both parties must have access to these 
accountability mechanisms, regardless of whether either party utilizes them or has need 
to. 
To summarize, a valuable blackmail agreement requires not only that the 
blackmailer has obligations and corresponding commitments regarding nondisclosure and 
unilateral renegotiation but also that the target has access to the special forms of mutual 
accountability that characterize agreements. If an agreement that lacks any of these 
components is fraudulent, then there are two separate arguments for why blackmail 
agreements are wrong. 
1. The Contingent Argument 
Appreciating one such argument requires two further assumptions. The first is an 
empirical claim that many blackmailers lack the commitments regarding nondisclosure 
and avoiding unilateral renegotiation that are required to make a blackmail agreement 
mutually valuable. The second is a nostrum about criminalization: if many tokens of a 
certain type of activity are morally problematic and justify criminalization, then the state 
may legitimately criminalize that type of activity.64 
Given these assumptions, what follows is a contingent argument about why 
blackmail is wrongful and appropriately criminalized: 
                                                
62 Legal examples of these accountability mechanisms include injunctive and declaratory 
relief and the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. 
63 The most notable example here is the panoply of legal remedies that are available for 
breaches of contract but not for promises. 
64 See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, Meta-Blackmail and the Evidentiary Theory: Still Taking 
Motives Seriously, 94 GEO. L.J. 787, 795 (2006); JOHN GARDNER & Stephen Shute, The 
Wrongness of Rape, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2007), at 29–32. 
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 (1) In any mutually valuable blackmail agreement, both parties have obligations 
and commitments regarding nondisclosure and renegotiation, as well as access 
to the mutual accountability mechanisms that are characteristic of agreements. 
(2) Many blackmailers lack the commitments described in (1). 
(3) When the conditions of (2) are realized, a blackmail agreement lacks value for 
the target. 
(4) It is fraudulent to exchange a token that you know (or have good reason to 
know) lacks the value characteristic of the type of which that token is an 
instance. 
(5) When the conditions of (2) are realized, a blackmail agreement is fraudulent. 
(6) If many tokens of a certain type of activity are fraudulent and fraudulence is a 
sufficient basis for criminalization, then the state may legitimately criminalize 
that type of activity. 
(7) The state may legitimately criminalize blackmail agreements. 
(8) Because the state may criminalize blackmail agreements, it may also 
criminalize proposals to enter into such agreements. 
Premise (1) is the definition of valuable blackmail described above; (2) is the 
empirical assumption; (3) follows from (1) and (2). (4) is the valueless-fraud proposition; 
(5) follows from the combination of (3) and (4); (6) is the application of the nostrum 
about criminalization, described above, to fraud; (7) follows from (5) and (6); (8) is the 
combination of (7) and what Mitchell Berman calls the “threat principle,” which says that 
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the legal and moral permissibility of a conditional proposal “tracks the permissibility” of 
the conduct conditionally proposed.65 
This contingent argument can explain why the ratification objection does not 
apply in cases like Wilde2. Allen’s proposal is, among other things, an attempt to usurp 
Wilde’s deliberative authority. Even if some valid agreement could ratify this incursion, 
any agreement emanating from Allen’s proposal would not have this effect. Such an 
agreement would lack mutual value because Allen would be committed to violating it. By 
entering into an agreement that lacks value for Wilde, Allen would commit a greater 
moral transgression than the real-life Allen did. He would not only attempt to usurp 
Wilde’s deliberative rights but also use him as a money pump. It is independently wrong 
to use someone in this way. Therefore, the contingent argument also explains the 
compounding effect of the blackmail agreement in Wilde2. 
The contingent argument also provides a straightforward justification for 
criminalizing blackmail—namely, because many blackmail agreements are fraudulent. 
Almost everyone, including libertarians who call for blackmail’s decriminalization, 
accepts that efforts to defraud may be criminally prohibited.66 Therefore the contingent 
argument provides a reason for criminalizing blackmail that even an abolitionist could 
accept. 
                                                
65 Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 42; see also Shaw, supra note 1, at 168. 
66 See Walter Block, Berman on Blackmail: Taking Motives Fervently, 3 FLA. ST. U. BUS. 
REV. 57 (2003), at 69–71, 107; Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
553 (1983). 
Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail 
 30 
A critic might challenge the contingent argument in several ways. One criticism 
denies the empirical premise. Historical evidence supports this premise,67 and game-
theoretical analysis suggests that the behavioral patterns described in the empirical 
premise would be rational.68 Moreover, the empirical premise has historical resonance. 
Consider Sherlock Holmes’s description of Charles August Milverton, the fictional “king 
of all blackmailers”: “Heaven help the man, and still more the woman, whose secret and 
reputation come into the power of Milverton! With a smiling face and a heart of marble, 
he will squeeze and squeeze until he has drained them dry.”69 Holmes’s metaphor of a 
blackmailer squeezing his target dry suggests that the empirical premise resonated in the 
Victorian era no less than ours. However, given the secrecy with which most blackmail is 
conducted, it is difficult to verify the empirical premise. 
Second, a critic might deny the nostrum about criminalization. Perhaps the 
nostrum is overly broad, since it allows for criminalization of entire types of behaviors 
when some tokens do not themselves run afoul of legal prohibitions. However, if a type 
of behavior is on balance morally problematic, then seemingly any plausible theory of 
criminalization could justify the legal prohibition of this type, even if some tokens of the 
behavior are themselves harmless.70 
                                                
67 E.g., MCLAREN, supra note 2; MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICITY AND 
SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 42 (1975). 
68 Shavell, supra note 58, at 1885–1887. 
69 A.C. DOYLE, “The Adventure of Charles Augustus Milverton,” in THE COMPLETE 
SHERLOCK HOLMES 572–573 (1960) (emphasis added). 
70 See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW (2008), at 159–176; R.A. Duff & Sandra Marshall, Remote Harms and the Two 
Harm Principles, in LIBERAL CRIMINAL THEORY: ESSAYS FOR ANDREAS VON HIRSCH 205 
(A.P. Simester, Ulfrid Neumann & Antje du Bois-Pedain eds., 2014), at 207. To alleviate 
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Third, the critic might assert that the commitment-less blackmail agreement 
actually has value for the target. This objection would challenge the definition of 
mutually valuable blackmail agreements by denying that a counterparty’s commitment to 
act in the way that an agreement contemplates is necessary for the agreement be valuable. 
Perhaps commitment-less blackmail agreements would have value in providing the 
blackmailer with a pro tanto reason not to disclose or renegotiate or in providing the 
target with some hope that the blackmailer will not act in these ways. Yet these kinds of 
value are nonstandard. On the same logic, certain hot checks might have value. For 
example, a hot check written by Bill Gates would have kitsch value, given Gates’s 
enormous wealth. Indeed, a hot check by Bill Gates written for, say, $2 would arguably 
have more value as a collectable than a viable check written by him for the same amount. 
However, Bill Gates’s $2 hot check would still be fraudulent because it would lack the 
value that is characteristic of checks. Likewise, an agreement would lack the 
characteristic value of agreements if one of the parties were, at the time of formation, 
committed not to act in the way that the agreement requires.71 Thus a commitment-less 
blackmail agreement would run afoul of the valueless-fraud principle even if it also had 
some nonstandard value. 
Fourth, the critic might argue that the contingent argument is incomplete. The 
contingent argument derives a conclusion about fraud from premises concerning value. 
                                                                                                                                            
legality concerns related to overbreadth, a state might legitimately criminalize a type of 
behavior that tends to be objectionable and provide an affirmative defense against 
liability for those who perform unobjectionable tokens of that behavior. Thanks to Grant 
Lamond for suggesting this point. 
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §530 cmt. c; Sheinman, supra note 7, at 367; 
AYRES & KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES, supra note 53, at 96–97. 
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However, the critic might contend, showing that an agreement lacks value for the target 
qua agreement does not establish that the blackmailer has committed fraud. Proving fraud 
also requires showing some misrepresentation by the blackmailer and (perhaps) that the 
target reasonably relied on this misrepresentation. Yet, the critic might conjecture, many 
blackmailers do not misrepresent their commitments. On this criticism, then, a 
blackmailer would not commit fraud if he were to represent accurately his lack of 
commitment to nondisclosure and avoiding renegotiation or if the target did not actually 
believe that the blackmailer was committed to living up to his obligations. 
This incompleteness objection does not apply to fraud in the context of 
agreements. By entering into an agreement, each party makes several implicit 
representations. One set of representations concerns commitments to acting in the way 
that the agreement specifies. Another implicit representation is that, to the best of his or 
her knowledge, the agreement could have the mutual value that agreements 
characteristically have. No explicit representation is required to establish that such an 
agreement is fraudulent. Rather, these representations can be inferred from the creation of 
the agreement. In the hot-check scenario described above, Ben could not escape liability 
by arguing that he never told Theresa that he had an account at the bank indicated on the 
check. Likewise, under the doctrine of promissory fraud, a blackmailer could not escape 
liability by contending that he did not represent that he would fulfill his part of the 
bargain at the time of formation. The existence of such a representation (as well as the 
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target’s belief that the blackmailer was so committed) can be presumed from the 
formation of the agreement.72 
A more pressing objection is that although the contingent argument might justify 
why blackmail can be criminalized, it fails to establish that blackmail agreements are 
morally wrong in a variety of circumstances. Consider the following variation on Wilde’s 
case. 
Wilde3: Allen proposes the agreement to Wilde just as in real life. Should Wilde 
enter the agreement, Allen would be sincerely committed to keeping Wilde’s 
letter secret and to avoiding renegotiation of the terms. Rather than being 
affronted by Allen’s proposal, Wilde is grateful and feels no pressure to accept. 
He would gladly pay far more than £60 for Allen’s silence. Therefore, Wilde 
enthusiastically accepts Allen’s proposal and enters into the agreement. 
Because Allen is committed to living up to his part of the agreement in Wilde3, 
his behavior falls outside the contingencies of the contingent argument. Also, Allen’s 
behavior is arguably not wrongfully coercive,73 even under the “usurpation” notion that 
undergirds the simple account.74 Deliberative authority (like other normative powers) can 
                                                
72 Further, although the target’s reliance is typically an element of the common-law tort 
of fraud, reliance is not an essential element of criminal prohibitions of fraud or in 
statutory schemes that punish fraud (such as consumer protection statutes or securities 
law). John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of 
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001 (2006). 
73 For example, on Fitzpatrick and Lamond’s views, the proposal in Wilde3 would not be 
coercive because Wilde welcomes it. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 39; Lamond, supra note 
1, at 226. On Berman’s view, the proposal would (probably) not be coercive because it 
does not exert pressure on Wilde. Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 66. 
74 On Shaw’s logic, even if Allen’s proposal in Wilde3 were an attempt to usurp Wilde’s 
deliberative authority, it might not be wrongfully coercive if it did not manifest 
impermissible disregard concerning Wilde. Shaw, supra note 1, at 179. 
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be ceded, and Allen’s proposal attempts to take control over deliberative rights that Wilde 
happily relinquishes. Moreover, even if Allen’s proposal were wrongfully coercive, the 
agreement between Allen and Wilde would seem to ameliorate these objectionable 
features, just as the ratification objection predicts. Finally, Allen’s conduct in Wilde3 
does not seem obviously worse than his conduct in real life. Wilde3 thus appears to defy 
the compounding effect. In sum, if the contingent argument is the only basis for 
establishing that blackmail is fraudulent, then it is difficult to conclude that Allen’s 
conduct in Wilde3 is wrongful. 
The contingent argument, then, provides a firm basis for criminalizing blackmail, 
but it fails to address other difficulties that beset the simple account. It cannot fully refute 
the ratification objection in cases like Wilde3, nor can it explain why the compounding 
effect is realized in these cases. More broadly, a complex account built solely on the 
contingent argument could not establish that blackmail is wrong in cases where the 
blackmail proposal is welcomed and leads to an agreement that appears to benefit the 
target. These shortcomings suggest two options: either concede that blackmail is not 
necessarily morally wrong in itself, or else find some other morally wrongful feature of 
blackmail agreements that is realized in cases like Wilde3. 
2. The Categorical Argument 
Blackmail is fraudulent and morally wrong because blackmail agreements lack the 
mechanisms for mutual accountability that characterize valuable agreements. The target 
cannot both hold the blackmailer accountable for his obligations and preserve the value 
of the agreement. Therefore, every blackmail agreement lacks mutual value and is 
fraudulent.75 
                                                
75 David Owens also concludes that the blackmail agreement necessarily lacks value for 
the target, although he identifies different features to explain this lack of value. David 
Owens, Should Blackmail Be Banned?, 63 PHILOSOPHY 501 (1988). 
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The crucial claim here is that blackmail agreements lack the accountability 
mechanisms that give agreements their distinctive value.76 Many of these accountability 
mechanisms operate by implicating nonparties to an agreement. The most obvious way 
that third parties are implicated is through legal institutions that enforce agreements and 
provide remedies for breaches.77 Blackmail agreements are not legally enforceable, so 
they lack these special accountability mechanisms. Suppose that after formation of the 
agreement a blackmailer proposes to reveal the secret to a third party or decides 
unilaterally to raise the price of his silence. Revealing the secret would violate the 
blackmailer’s obligations regarding disclosure, and coming back for more money would 
violate his obligations regarding unilateral renegotiation. Yet the target would have no 
way of holding the blackmailer to these obligations or obtaining redress for their 
violation. The blackmailer’s nonaccountability to the target indicates that the agreement 
lacks mutual value. This lack of value is problematic regardless of whether the 
blackmailer actually behaves in accordance with his obligations or whether the target 
ever has occasion to hold the blackmailer accountable. 
The problem here is a problem of power. Agreements are supposed to give parties 
special powers over each other. These special powers differentiate agreements from other 
methods of generating obligations, like predictions of future behaviors. Regardless of 
whether special powers of accountability are exercised, having them is part of what 
makes agreements valuable. Because blackmail agreements are unenforceable, they do 
                                                
76 DARWALL, SECOND-PERSON, supra note 14, at 196. 
77 Less formally, valuable agreements implicate third parties by generating agreement-
based reasons for the parties. These agreement-based reasons can be seen as “by nature 
public,” in that their “normative force” necessarily “extends across different agents.” See 
R. Jay Wallace, The Publicity of Reasons, 23 PHIL. PERSP. 471 (2009). 
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not effectuate the power transfers that make agreements valuable. As Sidney DeLong 
puts it, the target “buys nothing certain with his payment because the blackmailer can 
renege on her promise of silence and demand more money.”78 
To illustrate this analysis, consider the Wilde3 scenario discussed above. In order 
for an agreement with Allen to be valuable for Wilde in these circumstances, it would not 
be enough for Allen to have the requisite dispositions at the time of formation. 
Dispositions to live up to one’s obligations are fickle. Nor would it be enough for Allen 
simply to refrain from disclosing Wilde’s secret or raising the price of his silence. Allen 
might have behaved in exactly these ways in the absence of an agreement (as Allen did in 
real life). Rather, the Wilde-Allen agreement would only be valuable qua agreement if 
Wilde could hold Allen to his end of the deal. Yet if their blackmail agreement could not 
be enforced, then Wilde would lack this authority. Therefore the agreement described in 
Wilde3 would lack value for Wilde because he would have no way to hold Allen 
accountable. 
The abolitionist critic might object that this analysis begs the question. The 
fraudulence of blackmail agreements is, at least in part, a function of their legal 
unenforceability. Yet some abolitionists support not only decriminalizing blackmail but 
also making blackmail agreements legally enforceable.79 This type of abolitionist could 
argue that legally enforceable blackmail agreements would give rise to mutual 
accountability mechanisms. If so, then blackmail agreements are not necessarily 
                                                
78 DeLong, supra note 25, at 1691. 
79 See, e.g., Block, Crime of Blackmail, supra note 37. 
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valueless. Rather, their lack of value is a contingent feature of our legal landscape, one 
that the abolitionist urges us to reform. 
Answering this objection from the abolitionist requires showing that even if 
blackmail agreements could be legally enforced, targets would still lack the power to hold 
blackmailers accountable. Yet this proposition rings true. Holding a blackmailer to his 
obligations under a blackmail agreement would destroy the value of the agreement for the 
target. 
To see why, recall that one set of mechanisms unique to agreements involves 
mutual accountability. Agreements automatically enable one party to hold the other party 
responsible prior to violating the agreement, whereas alternative ways of generating 
obligations (such as promises or predictions of future intention) do not necessarily enable 
such prebreach accountability. Suppose that blackmail agreements were legally 
enforceable and that a blackmailer violated his obligations by attempting to raise the 
price of his silence. For the target, enforcing this obligation against the blackmailer 
would require publicizing the blackmail agreement. The target would need to reveal the 
terms of the agreement to third parties in order to establish that the blackmailer has 
violated them. Yet in paradigmatic cases of informational blackmail (at least),80 the value 
of the blackmail agreement for the target is a function of the capacity to avoid publicizing 
the subject matter of the agreement. If the target’s secret were made public, then the 
agreement would lack value for him. In such circumstances, the target “cannot complain 
or seek help for his dilemma without abandoning that which he wants to preserve.”81 So 
                                                
80 Thanks to Alex Sarch for urging clarification of this point. 
81 DeLong, supra note 25, at 1690. 
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even if blackmail agreements were formally enforceable, they would be practically 
unenforceable. Here, too, Sherlock Holmes’s description of the blackmailer Milverton 
seems apt: 
 “But surely,” said [Watson], “the fellow [Milverton] must be within the grasp of 
the law?” 
“Technically, no doubt, but practically not. What would it profit a woman, for 
example, to get him a few month’s imprisonment if her own ruin must 
immediately follow? His victims dare not hit back.”82 
If the blackmailer were to attempt renegotiation of the agreement, then the 
target (like Milverton’s victim) would “dare not hit back.” Yet the power to “hit 
back” at one’s counterparty—that is, to hold him to his end of the bargain, to 
avoid being squeezed until one has been drained dry—is at the heart of what 
makes an agreement valuable. 
This analysis supports the following argument. Unenforceable blackmail 
agreements would formally lack value for the target, who could not hold the blackmailer 
accountable. Enforceable blackmail agreements would practically lack value for the 
target (at least of informational blackmail), who could not both hold the blackmailer 
accountable and preserve the value of the agreement. To elaborate: 
 (9) Unenforceable agreements lack mechanisms for mutual accountability. 
(10) Blackmail agreements are not enforceable. 
(11) Unenforceable blackmail agreements lack value for the target. 
(12) Unenforceable blackmail agreements are fraudulent. 
                                                
82 DOYLE, supra note 69, at 573 (emphasis added). 
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(13) Enforcing an agreement requires accommodation by others, or publicity. 
(14) Enforcing a blackmail agreement would require publicity. 
(15) In cases of informational blackmail, publicizing a blackmail agreement 
would destroy its value for the target. 
(16) Enforceable blackmail agreements would lack value for the target. 
(17) Enforceable blackmail agreements would be fraudulent. 
Within this argument, (11) is the conjunction of (9), (10), and the definition of 
valuable agreements offered in premise (1); (12) follows from the notion of valueless 
fraud (represented above in premise (4)) and (11); similarly, (16) follows from (14), (15), 
and (1), and (17) follows from (4) and (16). 
This categorical argument explains what is wrong in Wilde3. The agreement 
between Allen and Wilde lacks the value for Wilde that agreements characteristically 
have. Wilde cannot hold Allen accountable for living up to his obligations under the deal, 
because blackmail agreements are legally unenforceable. Moreover, even if blackmail 
agreements were legally enforceable, any form of holding Allen to account would require 
revealing the terms of the agreement to a wider audience. This publicity would destroy 
the value of the agreement for Wilde. Therefore the agreement in Wilde3 is fraudulent 
regardless of whether blackmail agreements are legally enforceable. This logic is 
captured in Sherlock Holmes’s comment that blackmail is among the crimes “that the law 
cannot touch.”83 
The abolitionist critic might contend that this refined version of the categorical 
argument is still not categorical. Just as the unenforceability of blackmail agreements is a 
                                                
83 Id. at 581. 
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local contingent of our legal system, so is the notion that enforcing an agreement requires 
the kind of publicity that would destroy the value of a blackmail agreement for the target. 
For example, enforcement would not require publicity if there were special, secret courts 
for enforcing blackmail agreements against blackmailers. Blackmail agreements might 
also be enforced in secret proceedings of nonspecialized courts, in the way that many 
contracts concerning trade secrets or confidentiality agreements are enforced.84 If such 
arrangements were part of our legal system, then blackmail agreements might have 
mutual value. Therefore, the objection goes, blackmail agreements lack mutual value 
only because our legal system lacks these features. 
The best response to this abolitionist objection is to concede that the categorical 
argument is not strictly categorical. If legal arrangements allowed for the enforcement of 
blackmail agreements without publicity for (or scrutiny of) the subject matter, then 
blackmail agreements might have value for the target. However, no just legal system 
would include these arrangements, and the complex account can explain why. Blackmail 
agreements arise out of blackmail proposals, most of which (according to the simple 
account and other coercion-based views) are morally objectionable because of the way 
that they treat targets. Establishing institutions for enforcing blackmail agreements would 
require the state to put its imprimatur on these coercive arrangements. As Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin contends, states may decline to enforce morally objectionable 
agreements out of a “concern not to facilitate or assist harmful, exploitative, or immoral 
                                                
84 See, e.g., Block, Crime of Blackmail, supra note 37, at 26. 
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action.” In such cases, “the state refuses, for its own stake, to be a codependent.”85 A 
state would commit a transgression far worse than codependency or facilitation if it 
established special legal institutions to allow the making and keeping of blackmail 
agreements. Doing so would make the state an instrument of this domination, which 
would in turn violate the state’s “deontological commitment not to assist grossly unfair 
treatment of one of its citizens by another.”86 
To summarize the categorical argument, then, blackmail agreements are 
fraudulent in any just state because they lack the hallmarks of valuable agreements 
(especially legal and practical enforceability), and a state would act unjustly by providing 
mechanisms that would make such agreements mutually valuable. 
 
B. Some Strengths of the Complex Account 
This Subsection defends the coherence of the complex account, examines some of its 
strengths, and responds to some potential objections. 
The components of the complex account fit together, as can be demonstrated by 
focusing on Shaw’s simple account. Both coercion and fraud can infringe a target’s 
default discretionary authority in a way that manifests impermissible disregard for him or 
her. Beyond this, fraud is highly correlated with coercion. Blackmail agreements are 
fraudulent because the target cannot hold the blackmailer accountable for living up to his 
or her end of the bargain. In many blackmail scenarios, this lack of formal and informal 
accountability is combined with a severe asymmetry regarding vulnerability. The typical 
target has more to lose from the blackmailer’s failing to live up to his or her end of the 
                                                
85 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and 
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (2000), at 224. 
86 Id. at 235. 
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bargain than vice versa. These circumstances (along with the severe first-performer 
problem posed by blackmail agreements) provide ideal conditions for coercion to 
flourish. Therefore the contingent and categorical arguments about why blackmail 
agreements are fraudulent address the same worry about the usurpation of deliberative 
authority that animates Shaw’s simple account. 
The complex account also replicates the main strengths of Shaw’s simple account. 
By incorporating the simple account, the complex account can explain not only why 
blackmail is wrong but also why it wrongs the target in particular. Many blackmail 
proposals are impermissible attempts to usurp the target’s deliberative authority that 
manifest disregard for him or her. On Shaw’s view, these attempts wrong the target by 
encroaching his or her deliberative authority. However, a blackmail proposal that is not 
coercive (for example, the one described in Wilde3) would still violate the target’s 
deliberative authority, albeit indirectly through fraud. Proposing that the target enter an 
agreement that lacks the value characteristic of agreements is a way of tricking someone 
into relinquishing his full range of control over the obligations that apply to him or her. 
Here, the two prongs of the complex account allow for an explanation by subsumption: 
blackmail wrongs the target by attempting to take control over decisions that are within 
the target’s deliberative authority, or by attempting to trick him into relinquishing that 
authority, or by doing both.87 
                                                
87 This subsumption strategy is largely an artifact of the notion of coercion utilized in 
Shaw’s simple account. On the “usurpation” notion of coercion, fraud and coercion are 
not distinctive types of wrongs so much as different ways of instantiating the same wrong 
of impinging someone’s default deliberative authority. Coercion-based accounts that 
utilize alternative notions of wrongful coercion (such as Berman’s) do not allow for this 
strategy of explanation by subsumption. On such approaches, the coerciveness and 
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The complex account can overcome the difficulties (described in Section I.B) that 
beset the simple account and other coercion-based views. First, the complex account can 
explain why the ratification objection is incorrect. Recall that according to some 
commentators, it is possible for an offeree to ratify the objectionable features of a 
proposal or agreement.88 The complex account identifies two potentially objectionable 
features typical in blackmail: the proposal is coercive, and the agreement contemplated in 
the proposal is fraudulent. It is not enough to contend (as with the legal definition of 
unwelcomeness in sexual-harassment doctrine) that the target’s entering the blackmail 
agreement automatically ratifies the coerciveness of the proposal. In order for the 
ratification objection to succeed, the target must also ratify the fraudulence of the 
blackmail agreement. Whether this type of ratification is logically possible seems an open 
question. In any event, it cannot be inferred solely from the target’s acceding to the 
proposal. 
Second, the complex account can explain why entering into a blackmail 
agreement compounds the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal. The real-world Allen 
only attempted to coerce and defraud Wilde. If Wilde had entered into a valid agreement 
with Allen, then this usurpation would have succeeded. By entering into such an 
agreement, Allen would have obtained mastery over Wilde in the form of having a claim 
to hold Wilde to particular obligations. The appearance of this mastery to Wilde is 
objectionable itself, even if (due to the coerciveness or fraudulence of Allen’s proposal) 
the blackmail agreement was invalid and therefore did not actually transfer Wilde’s 
                                                                                                                                            
fraudulence of blackmail are distinct ways of wronging the target. Thanks Grant Lamond 
for showing the need to clarify this point. 
88 See supra, note 26. 
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authority.89 It is wrong to attempt to usurp someone’s deliberative authority. It is also 
wrong to try to convince someone that you have succeeded in taking control over his 
deliberative authority, even if your usurpation is unconvincing or unsuccessful.90 
Third, the complex account can both justify criminal prohibitions on blackmail 
and avoid revisionist conclusions about blackmail’s criminalization. Blackmail 
agreements are a conduit for fraud because they lack the mechanisms of mutual 
accountability that characterize valuable agreements. Fraud is a legitimate basis for 
                                                
89 Supra, note 31, To this point, I have assumed that the coerciveness of the blackmail 
proposal does not necessarily invalidate blackmail agreements. There is some merit to 
this assumption, since coercively imposed agreements (as well as other kinds of morally 
problematic agreements, such as unconscionable contracts and contracts with minors) are 
generally considered to be voidable by the party with the “power of avoidance,” rather 
than void ab initio. See Perillo & Murray, supra note 26, §1.6; Hamish Stewart, A Formal 
Approach to Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 175 (1997). In other words, the 
offeror who acts wrongfully (e.g., the blackmailer) cannot enforce the agreement against 
the offeree, but the offeree (e.g., the target) can enforce the agreement against the offeror. 
However, suppose that this assumption is incorrect and that, as some would argue (see 
supra note 28), the coerciveness of the blackmail proposal is sufficient to render any 
resulting agreement invalid. Even so, there is still a stench of fraud that makes the 
blackmailer’s proposal different from other kinds of coercive proposals. If blackmail 
agreements are void ab initio, then proposing a blackmail agreement amounts to what 
Scott Anderson calls a “bluff threat,” or an “issuance of a demand/threat by someone who 
lacks the power to execute that threat, and who knows that he lacks it.” Scott Anderson, 
Of Theories of Coercion, Two Axes, and the Importance of the Coercer, 5 J. MORAL. 
PHIL. 394 (2008), at 418. Bluff threats seem to be both coercive and fraudulent—that is, 
they are wrong in exactly the same way that blackmail is wrong under the complex 
account. If blackmail agreements are invalid ab initio, then the blackmailer proposes to 
create a relationship that is (in virtue of his making the proposal) both legally and 
logically impossible. This proposal counts as fraud under the notion of valueless fraud 
articulated above. Therefore, even if the coerciveness of any blackmail proposal renders 
every resulting blackmail agreement void ab initio, the complex account can still capture 
wrong-making features of blackmail that other coercion-based views leave out. Thanks to 
Niko Cornell and Brian Berkey, among others, for prompting this discussion. 
90 See Anderson, Enforcement Approach, supra note 14, at 7–8 (articulating the 
“enforcement” notion of coercion, on which “coercive acts may affect indefinitely many 
of a coercee’s activities some particular activity or activities, or none”). 
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criminalization, as even libertarians who otherwise advocate for decriminalizing 
blackmail should concede. 
Furthermore, the complex account provides a clean way to explain why blackmail 
should be criminalized whereas similarly coercive types of hard economic transactions 
should not.91 Hard economic transactions do not necessarily involve fraud in the way that 
blackmail does. The target of a hard economic transaction can formally enforce the terms 
of an agreement against the proposer who does not live up to her end of the bargain. Less 
formally, the target can hold the proposer to account by publicizing the proposer’s 
perfidy to others. However, the target of informational blackmail can neither legally 
enforce the agreement against the blackmailer nor publicize the agreement without 
destroying its value. 
In sum, the complex account can explain why blackmail should be criminalized, 
why there is a direct link between blackmail’s wrongfulness and the legitimacy of its 
criminal prohibition, and why blackmail differs from hard (but licit) economic 
transactions. 
The complex account can also reach the most plausible conclusions in Wilde’s 
case and the variations discussed above. In Wilde’s actual case, Allen behaved 
wrongfully because his proposal unjustifiably attempted to usurp Wilde’s deliberative 
authority and because the agreement that Allen proposed would have lacked value for 
Wilde. If, as in Wilde1, Allen’s proposal had led to an agreement with Wilde, then Allen 
would have committed a greater moral transgression than in real life. Allen would have 
attempted to usurp Wilde’s deliberative rights by making the proposal. If Wilde had 
                                                
91 Supra, notes 43–45. 
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entered into the agreement, then Allen would have either successfully usurped Wilde’s 
deliberative authority or (if the agreement was void ab initio) convinced Wilde that this 
usurpation succeeded. 
In Wilde2, Allen is committed to opportunistic renegotiation at the time of 
formation. His behavior in this scenario would lack two hallmarks of value—Allen would 
lack a commitment to live up to his obligations, and Wilde would have no way to hold 
Allen accountable. Therefore, although Allen attempts to defraud Wilde in both Wilde1 
and Wilde2, Allen’s lack of commitment makes the agreement in Wilde2 fraudulent in a 
way that the agreement in Wilde1 might not be. 
The complex account can also appreciate why Allen’s conduct in Wilde3 would 
be wrongful. Even if Allen’s proposal were welcomed by Wilde (and so perhaps not a 
frontal assault on Wilde’s deliberative authority) and Allen were committed to refraining 
from disclosure and renegotiation, Wilde could not simultaneously hold Allen 
accountable and preserve the value of their agreement. The agreement proposed by Allen 
would lack the value characteristic of agreements for Wilde. Therefore, Allen’s proposal 
is fraud. 
Finally, it might be objected that my defense of the complex account aims to 
prove too much. If the fraudulence of blackmail agreements is sufficient to establish that 
blackmail is wrong and should be criminalized, then why should we favor a complex 
explanation in the first place? Rather than seeing the wrongfulness of blackmail in terms 
of both fraudulence and coercion, why not stop with the former? 
Ignoring coercion undersells why blackmail is morally objectionable. On the 
simple account, both coercion and fraud can be seen as efforts to “take control over what 
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is properly within [the target’s] legitimate domain of judgment or action.”92 However, 
coercion seems to be a more serious infringement of someone’s deliberative authority and 
thus a greater wrong. In general, crimes that coercively impose harms or losses are more 
widely criminalized and more harshly punished than those that impose similar harms or 
losses through fraud.93 Perhaps the explanation for this discrepancy is that although both 
coercion and fraud violate someone’s deliberative authority, the target of coercion is 
made to know that her deliberative rights are impinged while they are being impinged, 
whereas the target of fraud is not necessarily privy to her own domination. 
 
                                                
92 Shiffrin, supra note 85, at 216. 
93 For example, rape can involve both coercion (when the perpetrator “compel[s] the 
victim by threat of nonphysical harm sufficient to overwhelm the reasonable person”) and 
fraud (when a perpetrator “obtain[s] sex by fraud or deception”). Russell Christopher & 
Kathryn Hope Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape, 87 IND. L.J. 505 (2012), at 
532–535. In many jurisdictions only fraud related to the core nature of the sexual act is 
held to negate a target’s consent to sex; other kinds of fraud (e.g., related to 
characteristics of the perpetrator) “are deemed as seller’s puffery and thought too trivial 
to warrant rape liability.” Id. at 534–535. By contrast, the vast majority of U.S. states 
criminalize at least some sexual acts in which a target’s consent is obtained in the wake 
of a coercive proposal by another. See Patricia Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by 
Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39 (1998), at 102 n. 309 (contending that forty jurisdictions 
have “at least one criminal provision outlawing the abuse of a position of power to obtain 
sexual intercourse”). Moreover, in some jurisdictions that criminalize both rape by 
coercion and rape by fraud, the former is a more serious offense than the latter. Compare 
CAL. PENAL CODE §266 (2015) (“[E]very person who, by any false pretenses, false 
representation, or other fraudulent means, procures any female to have illicit carnal 
connection with any man” is punishable by imprisonment of up to one year) with CAL. 
PENAL CODE §261(a)(2) (2015) (rape is, inter alia, sexual intercourse accomplished 
“against a person’s will by means of . . . duress,” defined as “a direct or implied threat of 
force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary 
susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or 
acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted,” and is punishable 
by imprisonment up to eight years). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Much of what is wrong with blackmail lies in the ways that the blackmail proposal 
coerces the target. Yet existing coercion-based accounts neither explain why noncoercive 
blackmail proposals are wrongful nor fully justify blackmail’s criminalization. These 
gaps can be filled by the complex account, which construes blackmail as an effort to 
coerce and/or defraud the target. Because I use Shaw’s simple account to demonstrate 
these points, my most immediate conclusion is narrow: a proponent of Shaw’s simple 
account should accept the complex account as a friendly amendment. 
More broadly, any defender of a coercion-based view can and should also 
embrace the complex account. Advocates of such views can continue to see coercion at 
the heart of what makes blackmail wrong, explaining why, ceteris paribus, blackmail is 
morally worse than noncoercive attempts to defraud someone. Yet the complex account 
provides a further insight: the fraudulence of blackmail agreements explains why 
blackmail is more seriously wrong and more legitimately criminalized than coercive 
proposals that do not involve fraud. 
Take the example of price gouging, a type of “hard economic transaction” that is 
linked in infamy with blackmail but is not uniformly criminalized. In the typical price-
gouging case, the seller takes advantage of the buyer’s desperate situation (sometimes, a 
situation caused by a natural disaster) to charge a higher-than-usual price for a critical 
good, such as an emergency power generator. On some views price gouging is coercive,94 
and on other views it is not.95 Assume, for the sake of argument, that price gouging can 
be coercive. Even so, this practice is different from blackmail in one important respect. 
The target of price gouging at least receives the value characteristic of agreements. If the 
generator does not work, the seller does not deliver it, or the seller returns later in the day 
                                                
94 See, e.g., Julius, supra note 14, at 369–372. 
95 See, e.g., Matt Zwolinski, The Ethics of Price Gouging, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 347 (2008), 
at 354–356. 
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to raise the price, then the buyer has formal remedies (like pursuing a refund or legal 
redress) or viable informal options (like sharing the news of the seller’s treachery with 
others).96 
The same is not true in cases of blackmail. The target formally and practically 
lacks the power to hold the blackmailer to his or her end of the deal. Yet this kind of 
power is at the heart of what makes agreements valuable. Thus focusing on coercion 
undersells what is wrong with blackmail. Blackmail is both worse and far less 
controversial to criminalize than other kinds of transactions (like price gouging) that are 
arguably just as coercive. 
                                                
96 Similar reasoning distinguishes blackmail from other putatively coercive transactions 
such as unconscionable contracts and so-called “unconstitutional conditions” cases. 
Unconscionable contracts are agreements whose “terms are seriously one-sided, 
overreaching, exploitative, or otherwise manifestly unfair.” Shiffrin, supra note 85, at 
205. Courts have latitude to decline to enforce unconscionable contracts. Id. Yet the party 
who is offered an unconscionable bargain (or, in the case of procedural 
unconscionability, unconscionably offered a bargain) is better off than the target of 
blackmail in at least one way: unlike the target of blackmail, the target of an 
unconscionable offer realizes some of the value characteristic of agreements. She can, for 
example, sue an offeror who fails to perform as bargained for. 
Cases of “unconstitutional conditions” involve “government offers to provide a gratuitous 
benefit conditioned on the offeree’s waiver of a constitutional right.” Mitchell Berman, 
Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 1 (2001), at 2. Berman notes that despite broad scholarly agreement that at least 
some such conditional offers are legitimate and others are not, “there is no consensus 
regarding whether and why any particular proposition of this form should pass muster.” 
Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 88. These doctrinal debates aside, the complex 
account suggests that “unconstitutional conditions” cases differ from blackmail cases in 
at least one important respect. Unlike the target of blackmail, a state that accedes to a 
condition that is ex hypothesi coercively imposed by the federal government (e.g., 
expanding its Medicaid eligibility in order to receive federal funds) at least realizes the 
value characteristic of agreements. It can, for example, sue if the federal government does 
not actually provide the funds or services referenced in the proposal. 
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The broadest implication of my analysis is that any account of what makes 
blackmail wrongful should scrutinize both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail 
agreement. Focusing only on the wrong-making features of the blackmail proposal 
obscures why some tokens of blackmail are wrongful. This strategy also creates 
unnecessary difficulties for explaining why blackmail is legitimately criminalized 
whereas functionally equivalent proposals are not. By contrast, an account that analyzes 
both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail agreement can avoid these difficulties. 
Thus, regardless of whether one accepts the complex account, a full explanation of what 
is wrong with blackmail should have this kind of complex structure. 
The blackmailer proposes to sell the target shelter from a coming storm. But the 
storm is of the blackmailer’s own making. The shelter provides no protection and it just 
might make things worse. There are two wrongs here, rather than one. 
 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix, I contend that Mitchell Berman’s evidentiary theory of blackmail faces 
the same difficulties as Shaw’s simple account. Here, too, the complex account should be 
taken as a friendly amendment, one that helps to resolve otherwise daunting explanatory 
challenges. 
Here is a brief summary of Berman’s evidentiary theory. A blackmail proposal 
references the blackmailer’s (B’s) future X-ing, which, if done, would harm the target 
(T).97 Despite this prospective harm, X-ing might or might not be permissible, depending 
(inter alia) on why B Xes or what B believes about X-ing when he does it.98 According to 
the “wrongful pressure” notion of coercion that Berman utilizes, B’s proposal is 
                                                
97 Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 71. 
98 Id. at 68. 
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wrongfully coercive when (i) the X-ing it references would, if completed, be wrongful 
and harm T; and (ii) issuing the proposal exerts pressure on T’s will or liberty to reject 
it.99 B’s making a blackmail proposal provides strong evidence that any future X-ing by 
B would not be done for good reasons or would be based on illicit beliefs, and so would 
be wrongful.100 Therefore, B’s making the proposal provides strong evidence that any 
future X-ing by B would (under Berman’s definition) be coercive. If it is wrongfully 
coercive for B to X, then it is wrongful for B to propose to do X.101 
Assume for the sake of argument that the evidentiary theory is both valid and 
sound. Even so, it faces each of the difficulties that Shaw’s simple account does. For 
example, the evidentiary theory cannot respond to the ratification objection, the idea that 
the target’s entering into the blackmail exchange can (under certain circumstances) 
obviate the objectionable features of the blackmail proposal. Because the evidentiary 
theory explains the wrongfulness of blackmail entirely in terms of the blackmail 
proposal, considerations related to the blackmail agreement are irrelevant to its account 
of why blackmail is wrong. 
Perhaps a proponent of the evidentiary theory might simply deny that there is any 
need to grapple with the ratification objection in the first place. It might be seen as 
                                                
99 This notion is a combination of how Berman defines wrongfully coercive proposals 
(Berman, Normative, supra note 14, at 55) and his contention that coercion operates by 
exerting pressure on the target’s “freedom to choose otherwise” (id. at 53; Berman, 
Blackmail, supra note 1, at 66). It is unclear whether Berman sees the connection 
between the proposed X-ing and the pressure that operates on T as conceptual (i.e., where 
X-ing would wrongfully harm T, it exerts pressure on T by definition) or as contingent 
(i.e., that many prospective X-ings tend to exert pressure on Ts). 
100 Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 68. 
101 Id. at 38. 
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obvious that in the typical blackmail proposal, the target’s entering into the agreement 
does not or cannot ratify the wrong-making features of the proposal.102 Yet this response 
would be controversial, and it requires an independent defense. There is a big difference 
between contending that the typical blackmail agreement does not cleanse the 
objectionable features of the blackmail proposal and contending that no blackmail 
agreements could have this effect. It seems possible to accept the former proposition 
while denying the latter.103 Berman concedes that some promises made in the wake of 
coercive proposals can bind the parties,104 so it would be difficult for him also to declare 
that all blackmail agreements are obviously invalid. Establishing whether the creation of 
the blackmail agreement can alter the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal requires 
analyzing the blackmail agreement in isolation from the blackmail proposal. Because the 
evidentiary theory construes the wrongfulness of blackmail exclusively in terms of the 
blackmail proposal, it lacks the resources to perform this analysis. 
The evidentiary theory also has difficulty accounting for the compounding effect, 
or the notion that the blackmailer’s actions can be both more coercive and worse when 
                                                
102 At times, Berman seems to have both advanced this position and rejected it. Compare 
Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 1, at 852 (“[V]ictims of blackmail, just as much 
as victims of holdups, are likely to view the threatener’s proposal as a ‘threat,’ not an 
‘offer,’ and to experience themselves as acting under duress,” such that their 
“acquiescence” is not “‘voluntary’ in a sense sufficiently robust to counsel against 
societal interference with his purported transactional autonomy”) with Berman, 
Normative, supra note 14, at 70 (the notion that a promisor “simply has no obligation, 
even prima facie, to honor a promise” made in response to “wrongful coercion” is “not a 
convincing position”). 103 See, e.g., Joseph Millum, Consent under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party 
Coercion, 17 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 113 (2014), at 114. 
104 Berman, Normative, supra note 14, at 68–69 (contending that the coerciveness of a 
proposal that leads to an agent’s promising is insufficient to establish that the agent is 
excused from keeping her promise). 
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the blackmail agreement is consummated than when the proposal is rejected. By its own 
lights, the evidentiary theory should see the compounding effect as significant. On the 
evidentiary theory, coercive proposals are objectionable to the extent that they exert 
wrongful pressure on their targets. Holmes’s suggestion that Milverton the blackmailer 
squeezes his targets “until he has drained them” suggests that the consummation of a 
blackmail agreement increases the opportunities for the blackmailer to pressure the target. 
Further, the blackmailer’s squeezing the target provides even better evidence than his 
making the proposal that any eventual X-ing by the blackmailer would be based on illicit 
motives or beliefs and therefore would be wrongful under the evidentiary theory. Thus 
the advocate of the evidentiary theory should accept that the compounding effect exists 
and is troubling: regardless of their validity, blackmail agreements provide more avenues 
for pressure and better evidence of wrongfulness than do blackmail proposals. 
Here, too, the evidentiary theory lacks analytic resources. The evidentiary 
theory’s focus on the blackmail proposal prevents it from analyzing these wrong-making 
features of the blackmail agreement. Yet these features seem to be important aspects of 
why blackmail is wrongful. 
Berman’s evidentiary theory also does not provide a compelling case for 
criminalizing blackmail. Berman contends that blackmail may legitimately be 
criminalized as a form of theft.105 Yet he does not extensively argue for this conclusion, 
and any theft-based case for criminalizing blackmail seems open to a host of 
                                                
105 Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72. 
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objections.106 In any event, each of the difficulties regarding blackmail’s criminalization 
that confronts the simple account applies at least as strongly to the evidentiary theory.107 
First, the evidentiary theory’s case for criminalizing blackmail is potentially 
illiberal.108 If blackmail is criminalized but other kinds of information releases with 
exactly the same objectionable features cannot be, then it follows that criminal liability 
for the same combination of behavior and mental states can vary based solely on the 
motivations of the actor. This prospect is difficult to reconcile with liberal theories of 
criminalization, which do not allow the criminal status of an action to vary based solely 
on the motives of the actor.109 It is also contrary to extant criminal law, which does not 
make this distinction.110 
                                                
106 For example, the blackmail-as-theft argument for criminalization does not 
automatically explain why blackmail is an inchoate crime. Someone is guilty of theft only 
if he obtains possession or control over the victim’s property. See Rivlin, supra note 28, 
at 419. Yet blackmail is a crime regardless of whether the blackmailer ever takes 
possession or control over any of the target’s property. 
The blackmail-as-theft argument also begs the question about whether blackmail 
agreements are valid. If, under certain circumstances (such as those described in Wilde3) 
blackmail agreements are valid, then the blackmailer’s acquiring money as part of the 
exchange is not theft by the blackmailer, so much as performance by the target. 
Characterizing blackmail as a form of theft therefore presupposes that blackmail 
agreements are invalid and thus renders blackmail agreements central to justifying 
blackmail’s criminalization. 
107 Moreover, unlike Shaw, who analyzes the moral wrongfulness of blackmail in 
isolation of whether blackmail should be criminalized, Berman sees the wrongfulness of 
blackmail as a premise in an argument for why blackmail should be criminalized. See 
Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 40. Therefore any tendency toward abolitionism 
counts as an internal criticism of the evidentiary theory. 
108 See Shaw, supra note 1, at 196. 
109 See supra note 41. 
110 Berman posits that “there is no reason . . . that an explicit description of [the 
defendant’s] motivation cannot be imported into a definition of the conduct to be 
criminalized” under blackmail statutes. Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 1, at 
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Second, the evidentiary theory cannot provide a principled basis for criminalizing 
blackmail while decriminalizing “hard commercial transactions” involving the same 
prospect of wrongful pressure that blackmail does. Berman advances two different 
strategies for making this distinction under the evidentiary theory, one based on the 
target’s interests regarding the X-ing referenced in the proposal,111 and the other based on 
                                                                                                                                            
843–844. This statement concedes that no existing blackmail statute allows for liability to 
vary based solely on the motivations (rather than the actions and mental states) of the 
blackmailer. Berman uses the example of “good faith” defenses to charges of criminal 
libel to illustrate the possibility of liability that varies based solely on motivation. Id. at 
844. However, this example is inapt, since the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that 
the legal status of information disclosures regarding public officials may vary solely 
based on the discloser’s motivations. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73–74 
(1964); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). Moreover, 
although every U.S. state criminalizes blackmail, the majority of states either lack a 
criminal libel statute or have had their statutes declared unconstitutional—in many cases, 
precisely because they allow for the possibility that a defendant’s liability could vary 
based solely on his motives. See David Kohler, Forty Years after New York Times v. 
Sullivan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203 (2004), at 1232–1233. 
Aside from criminal libel, Berman does not provide any other example of a crime for 
which liability for the same act and mental state combination could vary based solely on 
the motives of the defendant. See also Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail Is So 
Hard to Resolve, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585 (2012), at 629 (concluding that published 
blackmail cases reflect the principle that “a bad motive, with which a person knowingly 
performs an otherwise [legal] act, can[not] render [the person’s] conduct [illegal]”). 
111 In earlier work, Berman contends that the X-ing implicated in informational blackmail 
would set back legally protectable interests of T (namely, her reputation and emotional 
well-being), whereas the X-ing implicated in “hard commercial transactions” implicates 
interests that are not legally protected. Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 1, at 856.  
Although this discrepancy applies to the specific examples that Berman considers, it does 
not generalize to all cases of “hard commercial transactions.” For many “hard 
commercial transactions” involving legally protectable or protected interests (e.g., 
someone’s health or reputation or freedom), hard bargaining is nevertheless licit. A 
surgeon can make a firm, take-it-or-leave-it proposal about her rate to perform a surgery 
without committing blackmail. So can a lawyer regarding her rate for representing a 
client. If so, then blackmail cannot be distinguished from “hard commercial transactions” 
based solely on which interests are affected by the X-ing referenced in the proposal. 
Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail 
 56 
the wrong-making feature that X-ing manifests.112 For the reasons articulated in the 
previous two footnotes, neither of these strategies succeeds. Moreover, apart from 
whether either strategy succeeds on its own terms, Berman should not find either of them 
satisfactory. Berman concedes that each strategy yields the conclusion that some 
wrongfully coercive proposals constitute blackmail in the moral sense but should not be 
criminalized.113 Yet this concession conflicts with Berman’s metatheoretical contention 
that the “moral wrongfulness” of blackmail must provide “a sufficient basis for [its] 
criminalization.”114 
Third, the evidentiary theory’s case for criminalization is revisionist in a way that 
Berman believes it should not be. As noted above, the evidentiary theory explains the 
wrongfulness of blackmail based on features of the X-ing referenced in the proposal, the 
beliefs and/or motivations of the blackmailer, and the prospect that the proposal will exert 
pressure on the target’s will or liberty. On the other hand, the blackmail-as-theft 
argument says that blackmail is appropriately criminalized because any transfer of money 
                                                
112 In later work, Berman contends that hard commercial bargains and blackmail involve 
different kinds of wrongs, rather than different kinds of harms. Berman argues that 
blackmail proposals involve coercion, whereas hard commercial bargains involve the 
“less serious” wrong of exploitation and, as a result, provide a “less secure basis” for 
criminalization. See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 74. Berman seems to 
misconstrue the evidentiary theory here. Contra Berman, “hard commercial transactions” 
are coercive under the evidentiary theory because they involve an action that if completed 
would both be wrongful and would harm someone. Exploitation is a wrong-making 
feature of an action. Therefore, “hard commercial transactions” propose an action that if 
carried out would commit a wrong (i.e., the wrong of exploitation) and harm the target. 
Therefore they should be classified as coercive under the evidentiary theory. 
113 See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, Meta-Blackmail, supra note 64, at 798 n. 37 (noting that 
Murphy’s “Baseball” case involves a morally coercive proposal that for “practical 
imperatives, in our current society” we do not criminalize). 
114 Berman, Normative, supra note 14, at 82. 
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or goods from T to B in the wake of the proposal would constitute a form of theft by B.115 
The blackmail-as-theft argument therefore makes no essential reference to the features 
that, according to Berman, make blackmail wrong (such as the nature of X-ing, B’s 
beliefs and/or intentions, or the pressure experienced by T).116 Thus the evidentiary 
theory’s case for criminalizing blackmail conflicts with what Berman contends is a 
desideratum of any blackmail theory, namely that its explanation of why blackmail is 
illegal should also help explain why blackmail is immoral.117 
In sum, the evidentiary theory is abolitionist or revisionist regarding the 
criminalization of blackmail in each of the ways that the simple account is: its argument 
for legally prohibiting blackmail is difficult to reconcile with liberalism, does not cleanly 
distinguish blackmail from (licit) hard bargaining, and is divorced from the explanation 
of why blackmail is immoral. 
Berman’s evidentiary theory and Shaw’s simple account share many structural 
features and differ mainly in the notion of wrongful coercion that they utilize. Yet the 
same difficulties apply to the evidentiary theory as to the simple account. These 
difficulties, then, would seem to arise out of structural features shared by the two theories 
rather than out of the disparate notions of coercion that they utilize. In particular, both the 
evidentiary theory and the simple account construe the wrongfulness of blackmail in 
                                                
115 Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72–73. 
116 Some theorists use the blackmail-as-theft argument to explain why blackmail is 
immoral. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 51, ch. 17; Rivlin, supra note 28, at 419. However, 
Berman contends that this blackmail-as-theft strategy does not address the “puzzle of 
moral blackmail” that is his main focus. Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 53. 
117 Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 40 (“[W]e should not be satisfied” with 
explanations of why blackmail should be criminally prohibited “that do not also shed 
light on the puzzle of moral blackmail”). 
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terms of the blackmail proposal. If the analytic focus of the evidentiary theory were 
broadened to include the blackmail agreement, then each of difficulties identified here 
might be avoided in one fell swoop. 
One way to achieve this goal is to incorporate Berman’s evidentiary theory into 
the complex account. On this combination, the blackmail proposal would be coercive 
because it would provide good evidence that any X-ing by the blackmailer would 
wrongfully harm the target, and the agreement referenced in the proposal would also 
constitute an attempt to defraud the target. 
Integrating the evidentiary theory into the complex account would improve the 
former in several ways. This modification would provide ample grounds for responding 
to each of the difficulties described above. In response to the ratification objection, 
Berman could say that because the blackmail agreement is fraudulent, the target’s 
entering it does not affect the significance of the wrongful pressure occasioned by the 
blackmail proposal. Likewise, Berman could offer a ready explanation for the 
compounding effect: consummated blackmail agreements are worse than unconsummated 
proposals because, although both types of proposals involve both the prospect of 
wrongfully harming the target, the former also defrauds the target.118 For the reasons 
noted above,119 the fraudulence of the agreement at the heart of the blackmail proposal 
provides a sufficient basis for criminalizing blackmail, as well as a basis for 
                                                
118 On the evidentiary theory, the wrong involved in coercion (wrongfully putting 
pressure on another’s liberty to do otherwise) is distinct from the wrong involved in 
fraud. Therefore, a complex account that incorporates the evidentiary theory does not 
allow for an explanation by subsumption in the same way that a version based on Shaw’s 
simple account does. See supra note 87. 
119 See the discussion of why fraudulence is a sufficient basis for criminalizing blackmail, 
supra at Section II.A.1 and II.B. . 
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distinguishing blackmail from “hard commercial transactions” that even the abolitionist 
could abide. Finally, incorporating the evidentiary theory into the complex account would 
capture several desiderata of a theory of blackmail that Berman identifies but that the 
evidentiary theory fails to capture.120	
Thus the advocate of the evidentiary theory can and should accept the complex 
account as a friendly amendment. 
 
                                                
120 As noted above, Berman contends (a) that a theory of blackmail should draw internal 
connection between the explanation of why blackmail is immoral and why it is illegal and 
(b) that its explanation of why blackmail is immoral should also be sufficient to explain 
why it is criminalized. The evidentiary theory does not satisfy either of these desiderata. 
For Berman, the coerciveness of the blackmail proposal explains why blackmail is 
wrongful and (on the blackmail-as-theft argument) the fact that blackmail is theft 
explains why it is illegal. By contrast, the complex account can capture both of these 
desiderata: the fact that blackmail involves fraud would provide a common basis for 
seeing blackmail as both immoral and worthy of criminalizing. 
Here is a further respect in which the complex account improves on the evidentiary 
theory. By construing the case for criminalization in terms of fraud, the complex account 
can “persuade committed libertarians . . . based on libertarian premises” that blackmail 
should be prohibited, whereas (as Berman concedes) the evidentiary theory cannot do so. 
See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 58. 
 
